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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
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names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
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The number of national export promotion agencies 
has tripled over the past two decades. Although more 
countries made them part of their export strategy, 
studies criticized their efficacy in developing countries. 
The agencies were retooled, partly in response to these 
critiques. This paper studies the impact of today's export 
promotion agencies and their strategies, based on new 
survey data covering 103 developing and developed 
This paper— is a joint product of the Trade and Integration Team, Development Research Group, and Office of the Chief 
Economist, Latin America and the Caribbean Region—is part of larger efforts in both departments to study the how 
the structure of trade affects development. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.
worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at dlederman@worldbank.org.  
countries. The results suggest that on average they 
have a statistically significant effect on exports. The 
identification strategies highlight the importance of 
EPA services for overcoming foreign trade barriers and 
solving asymmetric information problems associated with 
exports of heterogeneous goods. There are also strong 
diminishing returns, suggesting that as far as export 
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In 1985, in the midst of the highest levels of hyperin
ation ever recorded in the history of
the Bolivian economy, President Victor Paz Estenssoro proclaimed that the country was in
its death throes and that it could survive only by exporting more of its production. Thus,
the phrase "export or die" was coined. As part of the reform package {whose cornerstone was
macroeconomic stabilization{ an export promotion agency (EPA) was created (INPEX).
Bolivia's search for development through exports is not exceptional. The rst EPA {still
existing{ was created in 1919 in Finland, and in the mid-1960s they became a popular instru-
ment to boost exports and reduce trade decits, under the auspices of the International Trade
Center (ITC, a joint UNCTAD-GATT multilateral organization). By the early 1990s their
eciency began to be questioned (Keesing and Singer, 1991 and 1991a). EPAs in developing
countries were criticized for lacking strong leadership, being inadequately funded, hiring sta
which was bureaucratic and not client oriented, and suering from government involvement.1
As a result, many development institutions withdrew their support to EPAs.2 Part of the
blame for the failure of the early EPAs was put on the import substituting trade regimes that
prevailed at the time. Overcoming such a strong anti-trade bias was probably too much to
ask of any specialized agency.
However, more than a decade later, the trade environment has signicantly changed in
the developing world and some EPAs under the auspices of the ITC have evolved in the
direction suggested by Hogan, Keesing and Singer (1991) in their in
uential piece.3 Prominent
development economists now recommend the creation of adequately funded EPAs in Africa
to overcome the costs and risks of entering unfamiliar and demanding international markets
(Helleiner, 2002). Our objective is to assess the ecacy of EPAs by estimating the eect of
1Similar critiques emerged for EPAs in developed countries; see Kotabe and Czinkota's (1992) study of
sub-national EPAs in the United States.
2Of the 73 export promotion agencies in developing countries surveyed for this paper only 21 had some
budgetary support from multilateral donors in 2005, and in only 11 agencies the budgetary support from
multilateral donors represented more than 25 percent of the total budget. In the case of one Sub-Saharan
African agency, more than 75 percent of its budget in 2005 came from multilateral donors.
3That is, there is more private sector involvement, larger funding, and a stronger organization and leader-
ship.
1today's EPAs on national exports.
The objectives of EPAs are to help exporters understand and nd markets for their prod-
ucts. The services oered by EPAs can be divided into four broad categories: 1) country im-
age building (advertising, promotional events, but also advocacy); 2) export support services
(exporter training, technical assistance, capacity building, including regulatory compliance,
information on trade nance, logistics, customs, packaging, pricing); 3) marketing (trade fairs,
exporter and importer missions, follow-up services oered by representatives abroad); and 4)
market research and publications (general, sector, and rm level information, such as mar-
ket surveys, on-line information on export markets, publications encouraging rms to export,
importer and exporter contact databases).
The economic justication for government involvement in export promotion is based on the
theory of asymmetric information and other market failures. There are important externalities
associated with the gathering of foreign market information related to consumer preferences,
business opportunities, quality and technical requirements, etc. Private rms alone will not
provide foreign market information, as companies hesitate to incur research and marketing
costs that can also benet competitors. The same applies to pioneer exporters, who make a
considerable investment in attempts to open foreign markets, cultivating contacts, establish
distribution chains and other costly activities that can be used by their rivals (Hausmann
and Rodrik, 2003). The uncertainty associated with trading across markets with dierent
regulations has also been put forward as a justication for export insurance schemes supported
by the public sector.4
The argument for public funding of EPAs would ideally be based on an assessment of the
social costs and benets associated with the activities of the EPA. Social benets are likely to
be larger than the social costs if there are large positive externalities associated with higher
current exports across rms, sectors or time and within the exporting country.5
4See Greenaway and Kneller (2005) for a recent survey of the literature on trade and externalities. For a
more skeptic view, see Panagariya (2000).
5Note that some of these externalities may travel across borders. It is clear that some of the benets from
export promotion activities can be captured by consumers in the importing country for whom search costs are
reduced. This undermines the case for national government funding of export promotion programs and calls
2It should be clear that program evaluation of EPAs on economic welfare grounds is dicult
if not impossible. Thus often {if not always{ evaluations of EPAs stop short of an assessment
based on welfare grounds, and focus on the more modest objective of assessing whether exports
have increased or whether new markets have been opened. This paper is no exception. Our
goals are twofold: rst, to determine whether EPAs are having an impact on exports; and
second, to identify the activities and institutional structures of agencies that are positively
correlated with exports.
As far as we know, there has been no cross-country statistical analysis of the impact of
EPAs on exports. The exception is perhaps Rose (2007), who estimates the impact of em-
bassies or consulates on bilateral trade using a gravity model. Rose argues that as communica-
tion costs fell, foreign embassies and consulates have lost much of their role in decision-making
and information-gathering, and therefore are increasingly marketing themselves as agents of
export promotion. In a sample of twenty-two exporting countries {of which eight are devel-
oping countries{ and around 200 potential trading partners, he nds that for each additional
consulate abroad, exports increase by 6 to 10 percent.
But EPAs are not consulates. In order to assess their eciency we undertook a world
survey of national EPAs to gather information on their objectives, activities and institutional
structure. We then econometrically explore the eect of EPA budgets on exports, as well the
impact of dierent institutional structures, objectives and activities of EPAs on exports.
The evidence suggests that on average EPAs have a positive and statistically signicant
eect on national exports, after correcting for sample-selection and omitted-variable biases, as
well as reverse causality. The identication strategies clarify the mechanisms through which
EPA services can stimulate national exports. EPAs seem to be be particularly eective when
they are most needed, namely, when exporters face onerous trade barriers abroad, and when
a large share of the export bundle is composed of heterogeneous goods. Nonetheless, there are
notable decreasing returns to scale in resources devoted to export promotion. Thus, as far as
EPAs are concerned, small is beautiful.
for multilateral interventions.
3Regarding EPA's institutional arrangements, objectives and activities associated with their
eects on exports, our results suggest the following. EPAs should have a large share of the
executive board in the hands of the private sector, but a large share of their budget should
be publicly funded. The proliferation of small agencies within a country leads to an overall
less eective program. However, we found no statistically signicant evidence regarding the
allocation of EPAs' expenditures across dierent activities or types of rms targeted by EPAs
(small versus large or established exporters versus non-exporters).
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our global survey of
EPAs and provides some descriptive statistics to help understand the objectives, activities,
and institutional structures that exist in EPAs around the world. Section 3 describes the
econometric strategy. Section 4 discusses the empirical results, and section 5 concludes.
2 Survey of EPAs: Summary Statistics
During the summer and fall of 2005 we conducted an eighteen-question survey of EPAs
around the world.6 Through the ITC website (www.intracen.org/tpo) we obtained a database
with contact information. We complemented this list with the help of World Bank country
economists who provided contact information for national EPAs. We contacted agencies or
Ministries in 116 countries, and 92 answered our request (of which 4 responded that they
could not respond). Each of the 88 surveys that we received was followed up with phone
conversations to conrm and clarify some of the answers. The list of 88 agencies appears in
the Appendix Table.
The survey contains ve parts: i) institutional structure, ii) responsibilities of the agency,
iii) the strategies followed, iv) resources and expenditures, and v) activities and functions.
Below we provide summary statistics by region.
6The survey is available from the authors upon request.
42.1 Institutional Structure
Around 10 percent of agencies surveyed are fully private; another 5 percent are joint public
private entities. The bulk of the agencies {62 percent{ are semi-autonomous entities reporting
to a Ministry or the Oce of the President or the Prime Minister. The reminder {23 per-
cent of the agencies{ are sub-units of a Ministry, and therefore subject to government hiring
regulations and pay scales.
Within the 73 agencies that reported having an executive board, on average half the seats
in the board {53 percent to be precise{ represent the private sector.
Finally, 80 percent of the agencies are either the only export promotion agency in the
country or are clearly the largest and most important, although there are signicant public
and private agencies working in closely related areas. This includes umbrella organizations
in which all private sector associations are members. In 20 percent of the countries surveyed
there are 2 or more agencies of equal importance.
2.2 Responsibilities
In terms of responsibilities, we explored whether the agency in charge of export promotion
activities was exclusively dedicated to export promotion, and if not, we asked the degree of
priority granted to export promotion within the agency. In high-income OECD countries
and in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) export promotion is the top priority of
the agencies in almost 70 to 80 percent of the countries. In LAC and SSA only half of the
agencies report export promotion as the top priority.
2.3 Objectives
The main objective pursued by 60 percent of the agencies surveyed is to increase aggregate
exports, no matter which sector or how big or small the export volumes. Around 18 percent
of agencies aim to promote non traditional exports only, and around 20 percent target specic
sectors. Around 2 percent attempt to develop industrial clusters, and other objectives.
52.4 Resources and Expenditures
The average budget of EPAs surveyed is around 0.11 percent of the value of exports of goods
and services, with a standard deviation of 0.35 and a median of 0.04 percent. The region
with the largest average budget is Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) at 0.17 percent of
exports. It is followed by countries in Eastern Europe and Asia (EEA) at 0.12 percent, and
then MENA, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), and the OECD with average budgets of around 0.09
to 0.10 percent of exports.
Regarding funding sources, around 52 percent of the agencies obtained more than 75
percent of their budget from public funding; 2 percent of the agencies obtained more than 75
percent of their budget from private funding; 3 percent of the agencies obtained more than
75 percent of their budget from selling their services (customer fees); and 2 percent of the
agencies obtained more than 75 percent of their budget from either multilateral or bilateral
donors. Thus, public funding seems to predominate as a source of funding. Three quarters
of the agencies surveyed had no private funding, and half had no income associated with the
selling of their services. When they reported some income, it represented on average less than
10 percent of their budget.
2.5 Activities and Client Orientation
As mentioned, we considered four main activities: 1) country image building; 2) export support
services; 3) marketing; and 4) market research and publications. The largest share of EPA
budgets is generally spent on marketing and market research and publications. Another item
which shows a large median {but also a much larger variance{ is other activities not related
to export promotion, except in the OECD, where the bulk (more than 75 percent of them)
spent less than 10 percent on activities not related to export promotion. At the opposite end,
in SSA other activities not related to export promotion represent between 10 and 25 percent
of the budget of most agencies (at the median). The importance of export support services is
also much larger in SSA than in other regions.
In terms of client orientation, the data cover the percentage of expenditures spent on large
6versus small and medium size rms, and established versus new and occasional exporters. A
very small share of total expenditure is spent on large rms, whereas a relatively large share
is spent on established exporters. Thus, in all regions the focus of the agencies is on small
and medium size rms that are established exporters.
In terms of representation abroad, 41 percent of the agencies have oces abroad (22 percent
of the agencies in SSA, 33 percent of the agencies in MENA, 35 percent of the agencies in
LAC, 47 percent in EEA and 67 percent in the OECD). In most regions agencies spend a
small amount of their budget on oces abroad, with the exception of the OECD where on
average 39 percent of the EPA budget is dedicated to oces abroad.
3 Empirical Framework and Identication Strategies
Our objective is to disentangle the eects of export promotion agencies, their structure, re-
sponsibilities, strategies, resources and activities on overall exports in order to understand
what works and what doesn't. The rst step is to explore whether there is any correlation
between export promotion budgets and exports. Figure 1 provides a plot of exports per
capita on EPA budgets per capita. There is a clear positive correlation between these two
variables. Figure 1 also provides the predicted value obtained from the corresponding locally
weighted regression (lowess), which provides us with some prima-facie evidence of which are
the agencies that are under-performing in terms of exports per capita given their budgets.7
For example Rwanda(RWA) would be expected to have a higher level of exports given the
budget of its EPA (under-performer), whereas the Irish agency (IRL) would be expected to
have a lower level of exports (over-performer).
There are three clear problems with the correlation discussed above. First, the sample
might be biased. It is restricted to agencies that answered the survey, even though we had a
perhaps surprisingly high 76 percent response rate.8 Second, other factors could be correlated
7An in depth and robust analysis of each agency performance is beyond the scope of this paper and would
need to be tackled through agency-specic studies. In this paper, we limit the scope to averages across groups
and variables.
8Even with such a high response rate, it may still not be a representative sample.
7with both exports and EPA budgets, which will also result in spurious correlations between
the two variables of interest. Third, the direction of causality might go from exports to the
EPA budgets, as countries with higher exports might tend to provide more generous funding
to their EPAs than other countries.
The estimation of a Heckman selection equation, which explains why some countries were
not surveyed, and why some agencies did not answer, addresses the potential selection bias
(Heckman, 1979). Our experience collecting contact information for EPAs helped us identify
variables that should be part of this selection equation. It was clear that obtaining contact
information for the relevant agency in poor and small economies was dicult, and even when
we did, it was dicult to get them to answer the survey. So GDP per capita and GDP are part
of the selection equation. Aid per capita also seemed to be an important selection variable
because many of the poorest agencies were substantially funded by bilateral and multilateral
donors. More formally, the selection equation that explains the latent variable z
c, which













where  is a vector of parameters and xc is a matrix of independent variables determining the
probability that the EPA in country c answered the survey. The latter includes explanatory
variables of the export equation (see below), except the budget of the EPA and the activities
of the agency that help us identify the export equation, plus the log of GDP, the log of aid per
capita discussed above, and regional dummy variables. The two exclusion restrictions are aid
per capita and GDP. Admittedly, economic size and aid per capita (our exclusion restrictions)
may be correlated with exports. However, the coecient on aid per capita is not statistically
signicant after controlling for the presence of EPAs in the export equation. This suggests
that it is a valid exclusion restriction.
8Regarding the endogeneity of export promotion, we control for numerous determinants of
exports that may be also correlated with export promotion budgets. The control variables
are: GDP per capita, an index of trade restrictiveness imposed on imports, an index of
trade restrictiveness faced by each country's exports in the rest of the world, volatility of
the exchange rate, an indicator of the regulatory burden that measures the average number
of days it takes to comply with all necessary regulations to export goods, the geography-
determined trade to GDP ratio, and regional dummies for EEA, LAC, MENA, SSA, and the
OECD. We also estimated specications with infrastructure variables (share of paved roads,
main telephone lines per capita) and indexes of institutional quality (ICRG indexes) as control
variables. These are highly collinear with GDP per capita and were not statistically signicant.
Moreover, in some cases they signicantly reduced our sample. Since this paper is about what
works in terms of export promotion, and these variables did not aect qualitatively our results
on export promotion, we do not report these specications.
The basic export equation to be estimated is then:
ln(Exp=pop)c = 0 + 1ln(Bud=pop)c + 2ln(GDP=pop)c + 3ln(T)c + 4ln(MA)c
+ 5ln(V ol)c + 6lnRegc + 7lnF&Rc + DummiesR + ec (2)
where the s are parameters to be estimated. Exp=popc are exports per capita in country
c, and Bud=popc is the budget of the EPA per capita in country c. GDP=popc is GDP per
capita measured as the average for the period 2000-2004 in 2005 constant U.S. dollars from the
World Bank's World Development Indicators. Tc is an index of trade restrictiveness imposed
by country c on its imports from the rest of the world, MAc is an index of market access
restrictions imposed by the rest of the world on exports of country c, and both are borrowed
from Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2009). V olc is the volatility of the exchange rate in country
c, measured by the coecient of variation of the dollar to local currency exchange rate during
the period 2000-2004 obtained from the World Development Indicators. Regc is the number
9of days it takes to comply with export regulations and procedures from Djankov, Freund and
Pham (2009). F&Rc is the geography-determined trade to GDP ratio provided in Frankel and
Romer (1999), which was estimated using a trade gravity framework where only geographic
variables were used as explanatory variables of bilateral trade 
ows.9 DummiesR are regional
dummies, and ec is the standard white-noise error. When testing for what works and what
doesn't in EPA modalities we add to (2) the variables discussed in section 2.
To address reverse causality or any remaining unobserved heterogeneity that may lead to
omitted variable bias, we instrument EPA budgets. First, we use the number of years to the
next election. The idea is that close to election time governments may be willing to increase
expenditures for political purposes. We will check for non-linearities in this relationship,
because governments with distant elections may also lack incentives to balance the budget as
they are not likely to be penalized in the immediate future. The second instrument is the
number of years since the creation of the EPA. It is not clear how the longevity of an EPA
aects the size of its budget. On the one hand, experienced EPAs could have larger budgets
as they become rooted in the government's institutional structure, and its sta become more
knowledgeable and in
uential in budgetary decision making. On the other hand, one of the
critiques of the previous generation of EPAs is that they were not adequately funded, and
there may be some hysteresis in the corresponding budgets. Again, to capture any potential
non-linearity in the relationship we also include as an instrument the square of the number of
years since the creation of the EPA.
A concern with the use of the number of years since the EPA was created as an instrument
is that it may be correlated with exports per capita. If an EPA is established when exports
reach a suciently high level (reverse causality), and if this threshold has been increasing
over time as world markets became more integrated, then the number of years since the EPA
was created may re
ect a lower level of exports. To address this issue, we also present results
where we control for the level of exports over GDP at the time of the creation of the EPA. If
9That is, EPAs cannot in
uence the geographic components of trade, such as geographic distance and
common borders between trading partners, but their budget may be correlated with the geography-determined
trade to GDP ratio as countries with larger trade 
ows might provide better funding to their EPAs.
10the mechanism described above is present, then this correction should increase the magnitude
of the estimated coecient on the EPA expenditures variable while the coecient on the
incidence of exports over GDP at the time of the creation of the EPA should be positive.
We pursue two alternative identication strategies that use the mechanisms through which
EPAs aect exports to try to address the endogeneity problem. If EPAs have an impact on
exports, they are likely to have a larger impact when they are most needed. When would
that be? We oer two alternatives mechanisms. First, EPAs might be most eective when
market access barriers in the rest of the world are high and need to be circumvented. A
positive and statistically signicant coecient in the interaction of ln MAC and ln Bud=popc
would allow us to identify this mechanism. One concern with this strategy is that exporters
could aect importers trade policies through multilateral and bilateral trade preferences, but
our measure of trade policy restriction is mainly driven by technical regulations and sanitary
and phitosanitary measures which are rarely and ineciently addressed in multilateral and
bilateral trade agreements (see Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga, 2009). Moreover, these are areas
where EPAs can help through on-shore export support services that help domestic rms
understand the technical requirements in the rest of the world.
Second, exports of heterogeneous goods, which are more likely to be aected by asymmetric
information, a barrier that can be overcome with the assistance of EPAs. For example,
EPA services might not be needed to export oil or other commodities. Thus a negative and
statistically signicant coecient on the interaction of EPA expenditures with a variable that
captures the degree of homogeneity in the export bundle would imply that EPAs are more
likely to help when the export bundle of a given country has a larger share of heterogeneous
goods. To implement this identication strategy, we follow the approach pioneered by Rajan
and Zingales (1998) by estimating (2) at the product level (4 digits of the SITC rev. 2
classication),10 and add as an explanatory variable Rauch's (1999) dummy for homogeneous
goods. Rauch (1999) classied goods on the basis of whether they were traded in an exchange
(organized), had prices listed in trade publications (reference), or were brand name products
10For each country and each four digit SITC product, we use average exports during 2000-2004, and divided
per capita as in (2).
11(dierentiated). The homogeneous goods category includes products that are traded in an
exchange and those that are reference priced.11 The interaction of the homogeneous good
dummy with the the budget of the EPA identies the asymmetric information problem that
EPAs can help resolve.
4 Results
The result from the estimation of (1) and (2) are shown in Table 1 for the whole sample and for
developing countries using OLS and a Heckman-selection correction. Across all specications
the EPA budget has a positive and statistically signicant eect on exports. The coecient
is not statistically dierent across estimators or samples, which suggests that there is little
heterogeneity in the impact of EPAs on exports per capita.12 Note however, that the selec-
tion parameter  is statistically dierent from zero in both samples suggestions that sample
selection is an issued to be addressed in both samples.
The elasticity is around 12 percent which is slightly higher than the range of estimates by
Rose (2007), which suggest that the presence of a consulate or embassy engaged on export
promotion leads to a 6 to 10 percent increase in exports. Also, note that this is not a welfare
calculation, and such \returns" may be consistent with a welfare loss associated with EPA's
activities, as discussed earlier. Moreover, a point estimate of 0.12 suggests that there are
strong diminishing returns to scale. Consequently, large expansions of EPAs budgets may not
be desirable.
Regarding the other explanatory variables, GDP per capita (ln GDP=pop) has a positive
and statistically signicant sign in all specications suggesting that richer countries, with
stronger and better institutions {including trade institutions{ export more. The restrictive-
11Rauch provides a liberal and a conservative classication of homogeneous goods and we will be reporting
results for both in the next section. The conservative classication has 495 goods classied as homogeneous
out of 1189 SITC rev. 2 4 digit goods, and the liberal classication includes 533 goods.
12We also estimate the equation in the rst column using a Poisson estimator and a robust regression
estimator to correct for Jensen-inequality biases in the coecients (Santos-Silva and Tenreyro, 2007), outliers
or other forms of heteroscedasticity. Results are qualitatively the same and not statistically dierent from the
ones reported here. They are available upon request.
12ness of the exporting country import regime (ln T) does not seem to aect export performance,
suggesting that general equilibrium eects are not a strong determinant of exports.13 In con-
trast, the restrictiveness faced by exporters (ln MA) in the rest of the world strongly reduces
exports across all specications with a slightly higher coecient for developing countries, but
the dierences are not statistically dierent from zero. Exchange rate volatility (ln V ol) also
has a negative impact on exports, although it is statistically signicant only before correcting
for sample bias.14 The number of days necessary to comply with export regulation in the
exporting country has a negative, but generally insignicant impact on exports. The geogra-
phy component of the trade to GDP ratio as provided in Frankel and Romer (1999) is always
positive and statistically signicant.
In both selection equations, size and aid per capita {our exclusion restrictions{ have a
positive and statistically signicant coecient. Thus, larger countries receiving large amounts
of aid were more likely to be in our sample, probably re
ecting the agencies' capacity to
answer the survey.
As previously discussed, the results in Table 1 might suer from reverse-causality and
omitted-variable biases. To address these concerns, the rst column of Table 2 provides
instrumental variable estimates, where the number of years since the creation of the EPA
and the number of years to the next election, as well as their squared terms are used as
instruments. The second column corrects for sample selection bias. The last two columns
reproduce the results of the rst two columns, but controlling for exports over GDP at the
time of the creation of the EPA.
The interesting result from these 2SLS regressions is that the coecient on EPA budgets
13This result also suggests that in the early 2000s contrary to what was observed by Keesing and Singer
(1991a) in the 1980s, the main constraint to exports is no longer the anti-trade bias of the import regime.
14The lack of a signicant eect of nominal exchange-rate volatility on exports is consistent with results
reported by Tenreyro (2007). This author shows that estimates of the eect of volatility on exports are quite
fragile in the context of the gravity model of trade. The intuitive argument is that on the one hand, volatility
reduces trade as it might act as friction against international transactions (i.e., by raising the costs of trade).
On the other hand, exchange-rate 
uctuations can oer prot opportunities for traders. Hence the net eect
might be ambiguous. Also, the existence of nancial instruments that help agents protect themselves against
risk would also support the view that volatility might not have signicant deleterious eects on international
trade 
ows.
13declines considerably in the rst two columns relative to those presented in Table 1, although
the dierences are not statistically signicant. One potential explanation for this is reverse
causality: EPA budgets tend to rise with exports.15 The coecients are still positive and
statistically dierent from zero, regardless of whether we correct for sample-selection bias.
The point estimates are now within Rose's (2007) range of 6 to 10 percent.
Regarding the control variables, the log of GDP per capita, the log of trade restrictiveness
in the rest of the world, and the log of geography-determined trade to GDP ratio are the
most robust determinants of exports per capita across specications. Exchange-rate volatility
always has a negative sign as expected, but it is never statistically dierent from zero.
To validate the instruments, we report the Hansen J-test of over-identifying restrictions,
with the null hypothesis being that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term. The
test has a p-value of 0.23 and consequently implies that the exclusion restrictions are valid.
Nevertheless, as argued earlier, the number of years may be correlated with exports in the
presence of reverse causality and heterogeneity in threshold eects at the time of the creation
of the EPA. Thus in the last two columns we control for exports over GDP when the EPA
was created. The coecient on EPA budgets is still positive and statistically signicant. The
coecient on the exports to GDP ratio at the time of creation is positive and statistically
signicant, while the coecients on EPA budgets is higher than the ones reported in the
rst two columns, although they not statistically dierent. This indicates that the number
of years since the EPA was created may be negatively correlated with exports at the time
of EPA's creation as argued earlier. More importantly, results are robust to this alternative
specication.
15Note that only a handful of countries in our sample report explicitly taxing exports to nance EPA's
budget, but other mechanisms, such as political economy considerations, can explain this.
144.1 Alternative Identication Strategies
We explore two alternative identication strategies that draw on dierent mechanisms through
which EPAs may aect exports.16 The rst explores whether the impact of EPAs is stronger
when exporters face strong trade barriers abroad. The idea is that EPAs help exporters cir-
cumvent these barriers through exporter support services that provide technical assistance to
exporters on technical regulations and other requirements in foreign markets. This mecha-
nism is captured by the interaction of EPA budgets with the degree of foreign market access
restrictions.
The rst two columns of Table 3 show the results with and without the sample-selection
correction. They conrm the intuition that the eect of EPA is more notable when market
access barriers are high. The relevant interaction term has a positive and statistically signi-
cant coecient. Note also that the coecient on EPA budgets is still positive and statistically
signicant as well. The size of this coecient is signicantly larger than the ones reported
in Table 1, but it only captures the partial eect of EPA budgets on exports. The derivative
of the left hand side with respect to ln BUD=pop and evaluate at the mean of ln T (which
is equal to -2.4, which is also its median) re
ects the total eect. It is equal to 0.140 with a
standard error of 0.035 in the rst column and 0.148 in the second column with a standard
error of 0.031, both of which are not statistically dierent from the ones reported in Table
1. More importantly, the eect of EPAs rise with the severity of barriers to access to foreign
markets, thus providing valuable information about the mechanisms through which EPAs may
be working.17
16The endogeneity issue could further be tackled with a dierences-in-dierences estimator, but this requires
panel data. There are at least two problems with this. First, the agencies of the 1980s were apparently a
very dierent animal from the agencies of today, and dierent agencies have reformed at dierent times. This
heterogeneity of the impact of EPA on exports across time would not be captured by a dierences-in-dierence
approach. Also, some of our explanatory variables are only available for the early 1990s. This is the case of
the trade restrictiveness index and the market access trade restrictiveness index which are borrowed from Kee,
Nicita and Olarreaga (2009).
17We also tested whether EPAs would be more ecient when facing larger geographic barriers abroad. We
did not have strong priors on this issue, because it is not clear how EPAs could help exporters overcome
geographic barriers. In any case, the interaction of EPA budgets with the Frankel and Romer variable yielded
negative but statistically insignicant results. We also used a theoretically derived measure of market potential
by Mayer (2008), but again the interaction term was statistically insignicant. Perhaps EPAs help overcome
15The second mechanism we explore is whether EPAs help overcome asymmetric information
aecting exports of heterogeneous goods. The specication presented in the third column of
Table 3 uses Rauch's conservative classication of homogeneous goods and the last column
the liberal classication. The interaction between the homogeneous good classication and
EPA budgets is negative in both cases, suggesting that an increase in EPA budgets has a
smaller eect on exports of homogeneous than on heterogeneous goods, as expected. The rest
of the variables have the expected signs, with the exception of the volatility of exchange rates
(again, see Tenreyro (2007) for an explanation).
Two additional issues are raised by the specication presented in the last two columns of
Table 3. First, the right-hand-side variable varies by country and product, whereas the only
explanatory variable that does so is the interaction variable. Consequently the regression errors
may be correlated across countries or product categories. Second, unobserved heterogeneity
could be a source of biased estimates. Table 4 shows results where national exports per capita
at the SITC 4-digit level are explained by SITC 4-digit and country xed eects in addition
to the interaction of EPA budgets with either Rauch's conservative or liberal measure of
homogeneous goods. We also provide adjusted estimates of the standard error, namely White
robust errors, clustered by country and clustered by SITC 4-digit products. The interaction
is negative and statistically signicant, regardless of how standard errors are computed, thus
suggesting that EPAs may be more ecient when economies need to overcome the asymmetric
information associated with a large share of heterogeneous goods in the export bundle.
4.2 What Works, What Doesn't?
To explore the type of institutional structures, strategies, and activities that are more ecient
we added to our basic specication in (2) some of the variables discussed in section 2. Results
using OLS, 2SLS and a 2-step Heckman estimators are presented in Table 5. Some words of
caution are appropriate before discussing these results. First, the sample has been reduced
to 52 observations due to the fact that many agencies did not answer all questions in the
policy-induced barriers to trade but not geography.
16survey. Second, some of these additional variables may also be endogenous and therefore the
coecients should be interpreted as nothing more than conditional correlations.
The top of the table shows the estimates for the variables in (2), which are qualitatively
similar to the ones in Tables 1-3. EPA's budget per capita, GDP per capita, and the geography-
determined trade to GDP ratios have a positive and statistically signicant eect on exports
per capita in both samples. The trade restrictiveness of the rest of the world faced by exporters
and the volatility of the exchange rate have a negative and statistically signicant eect on
exports per capita in both samples. In contrast with earlier results, the burden of export
regulations has a negative and signicant eect on exports per capita.
The bottom of the table reports estimates for the additional variables capturing EPA
modalities. In all regressions, exports increase with the share of the EPA executive board
seats that are held by the private sector. But there is also weak evidence that exports also
increase with the share of EPA funding coming from the public sector (although this eect
is signicant only when we use the 2SLS estimator). This suggests that agencies that are
directed by the private sector, but have public funding are the best performers. After all, the
rationale for export promotion is about externalities, and it may be dicult to raise private
sector funding when benets are diuse.
The proliferation of agencies dedicated to export promotion within a country ("Degree of
decentralization of agencies") is negatively correlated with exports. A single and strong EPA
seems to be more eective than multiple agencies with overlapping responsibilities.18 Note,
however, that the OLS coecient is not statistically signicant.
The allocation of expenditures between country image, export support services, marketing
and market research do not have any statistically signicant correlation with exports. We
also have no evidence regarding EPA targeting of large versus small rms, nor about target-
ing established exporters versus non exporters. The same is true for the presence of EPA
representation oces abroad or the overall strategy of the EPA (sectoral focus versus broad
18This is a discrete variable that takes the value 1 if there is only one EPA in the country, 2 if there is one
large, but many small agencies, 3 if there are two mayor agencies and several small, and 4 if there are more




uential study of export promotion agencies in the 1980s, Hogan, Keesing, and
Singer (1991) argued that EPAs in developing countries were not eective, because they lacked
strong leadership, had inadequate funding, were too bureaucratic, were not client oriented, and
had heavy government involvement. Moreover, they also had to overcome strong anti-export
biases induced by trade policies.
Over the last decade, the structure and activities of EPAs changed in the direction sug-
gested by Hogan, Keesing and Singer, under the auspices of the International Trade Center
in Geneva. Also, trade policies became more export-oriented. Our estimates suggest that to-
day's EPAs are eective in terms of having an impact on national exports. Our point estimate
suggests that a 10 percent increase in EPA budgets at the mean leads to a 0.6 to 1 percent
increase in exports, after correcting for selection and endogeneity biases. More interestingly,
EPAs seems to be more eective when they can help circumvent trade barriers abroad or
asymmetric information associated with a large share of heterogeneous goods in the export
bundle.
Regarding what works and what doesn't, our estimates suggest that EPAs with a large
share of the executive board in the hands of the private sector, but a large share of public
sector funding, are associated with higher national exports than other countries. In other
words, full privatization of EPAs may not be ideal. A single strong EPA rather than the
proliferation of small agencies within countries is also positively correlated with exports.
Last but not least, words of caution are warranted. First, regarding the methodology used
to derive these conclusions, cross-country regressions cannot fully capture the heterogeneity
of policy environments and institutional structures in which agencies operate. Case studies
are needed provide more specic policy advice. Second, the relatively large average \returns"
to EPA expenditures do not provide a justication for those budgets on welfare grounds,
18as these will need some measurement of the externalities and net benets associated with
export promotion. Moreover, higher returns may be obtained by investing those resources
in improving the overall business climate (e.g., infrastructure, education, etc.). The analyses
discussed herein, however, do provide guidance about EPA's institutional design, objectives
and activities. Finally, the evidence of diminishing returns to scale in EPA budgets suggests
that small is beautiful when it comes to EPAs.
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22Table 2: Two-stage-least-square estimatesa
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Heckman Heckman
Log of Budget per capita 0.043? 0.052?? 0.089? 0.095??
(ln Bud=pop)b ( 0.022 ) ( 0.019 ) ( 0.045 ) ( 0.044 )
Log of GDP per capita 0.820?? 0.978?? 0.848?? 0.951 ??
(ln GDP=pop) ( 0.146 ) ( 0.135 ) ( 0.130 ) ( 0.143 )
Log of Trade restrictiveness -0.158 -0.274?? 0.043 -0.047
(ln T) ( 0.142 ) ( 0.127 ) ( 0.134 ) ( 0.123 )
Log of Trade restrictiveness in ROW -1.255?? -1.316?? -0.921?? -0.969??
(ln MA) ( 0.348 ) ( 0.285 ) ( 0.294 ) ( 0.257 )
Log of Forex volatility -0.160 -0.163 -0.109 -0.109
(ln V ol) ( 0.155 ) ( 0.145 ) ( 0.125 ) ( 0.120 )
Days to comply with export -0.013? -0.009 -0.008 0.005
regulation (ln Reg) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.007 ) ( 0.007 ) ( 0.006 )
Log of geo-trade/GDP ratio 0.525?? 0.403?? 0.431?? 0.363??
(ln F&R) ( 0.181 ) ( 0.085 ) ( 0.084 ) ( 0.079 )
Log of Exp/GDP at time 0.272?? 0.224??
of EPA creation ( 0.076 ) ( 0.071 )
Constant -4.759?? -6.476?? -4.351?? -5.425??
( 1.372 ) ( 1.173 ) ( 1.340 ) ( 1.353 )
Regional dummiesc Yes Yes Yes Yes
P-value of Chi-squared Wald-test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of observations 78 102 74 102
Number of uncensored 78 77 74 73
R-squared 0.952 0.961 0.967 0.970
d NA 0.944?? NA 0.530??
( 0.258 ) ( 0.200 )
aAll regressions used a 2SLS estimator. EPA's budget per capita is instrumented using the number of
years since the EPA was created and the number of years to the next election, as well as their squared terms.
Estimates for the rst stage regression are provided in the Auxiliary Regressions Appendix that is available
on-line or upon request from the authors. In the case of the Heckman estimates we also correct for sample
selection bias, using a two step approach.
bStandard errors are in parenthesis; ?? stands for signicance at the 5 percent level; and ? stands for
signicance at the 10 percent level.
cThe regional dummies are LAC, OECD, EEA, MENA, and SSA.
dThe selection parameter  (Mills ratio) captures the extent to which selection is a problem in the sample.
When statistically dierent from zero, this suggest that there is a sample bias that needed to be corrected.
23Table 3: Alternative identication strategies: disentangling the mechanisms
Overcoming MA barriers Overcoming heterogeneity
OLS Heckman Conservativeb Liberalb
Log of Budget per capita 0.491?? 0.550?? 0.054?? 0.055??
(ln Bud=pop)a ( 0.158 ) (0.133) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.003 )
Log of GDP per capita 0.764?? 0.917?? 0.775?? 0.775??
(ln GDP=pop) ( 0.148 ) ( 0.141 ) ( 0.031 ) ( 0.031 )
Log of Trade restrictiveness -0.136 -0.234? - 0.469?? -0.469??
(ln T) ( 0.119 ) ( 0.111 ) ( 0.037 ) ( 0.037 )
Log of Trade restrictiveness in ROW -1.180?? -1.180?? -2.600?? -2.599??
(ln MA) ( 0.319 ) ( 0.270 ) ( 0.068 ) ( 0.068 )
Log of Forex volatility -0.192 -0.188? 0.090?? 0.090??
(ln V ol) ( 0.123 ) ( 0.109 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.008 )
Days to comply with export -0.008 -0.003 -0.008?? -0.008??
regulation (ln Reg) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.007 ) ( 0.002 ) ( 0.002 )
Log of geo-trade/GDP ratio 0.524?? 0.420?? 0.407?? 0.407??
(ln F&R) ( 0.093 ) ( 0.082 ) ( 0.022 ) ( 0.022 )
Interaction Budget and 0.164?? 0.188??
Trade Restrictiveness in ROW ( 0.069 ) ( 0.060 )
Interaction Budget and -0.015?? -0.016??
Homogeneous good dummyb ( 0.004 ) ( 0.004 )
Constant -3.996?? -5.476?? -24.68?? -24.68??
( 1.213 ) ( 1.109 ) ( 0.327 ) ( 0.327 )
Regional dummiesc Yes Yes Yes Yes
P   value of F or Chi-squared Wald-test.d 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of observations 78 103 58540 58540
Number of uncensored 78 77 58540 58540
R-squared 0.957 0.965 0.373 0.374
e NA 0.832?? NA NA
( 0.230 )
aWhite robust standard errors are in parenthesis; ?? stands for signicance at the 5 percent level; and ?
stands for signicance at the 10 percent level.
bThis is Rauch dummy for homogeneous goods (see Rauch, 1999). The third column Rauch conservative
denition of homogeneous goods and the fourth column the more liberal denition.
cThe regional dummies are LAC, OECD, EEA, MENA, and SSA.
dFor OLS estimates we report the F-test and for Heckman estimates we report the Wald test on the joint
signicance of all coecients.
eThe selection parameter  (Mills ratio) captures the extent to which selection is a problem in the sample.
When statistically dierent from zero, this suggest that there is a sample bias that needed to be corrected.Table 4: EPAs and exports of homogeneous goods: controlling for unobserved
heterogeneity
Conservative def. Liberal denition
Interaction EPAs Budget and Homogeneous good dummya -0.047 -0.046
(ln Bud=pop*Homo)b ( 0.003 ) ( 0.003 )
[ 0.010 ] [ 0.010 ]
f 0.006 g f 0.006 g
SITC 4 digit dummies Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes
P   value of F -test. 0.000 0.000
Number of observations 60923 60923
R-squared 0.619 0.620
aThis is Rauch dummy for homogeneous goods (see Rauch, 1999). The rst column uses Rauch conservative
denition of homogeneous goods and the second column the more liberal denition.
bWhite robust standard errors are in parenthesis ( ); Standard errors clustered by country are in squared
brackets [ ], and standard errors clustered by SITC 4 digit product are in curly brackets or braces f g.Table 5: EPAs: what works, what doesn't?a
OLS 2SLS 2SLS + Heckman
Log of Budget per capita 0.064 0.089?? 0.072??
(ln Bud=pop)b ( 0.064 ) ( 0.026 ) ( 0.022 )
Log of GDP per capita 0.669?? 0.477?? 0.577??
(ln GDP=pop) ( 0.206 ) ( 0.189 ) ( 0.164 )
Log of Trade restrictiveness -0.132 -0.176 -0.212
(ln T) ( 0.215 ) ( 0.196 ) ( 0.167 )
Log of Trade restrictiveness in ROW -1.366?? 1.504?? -1.605??
(ln MA) ( 0.587 ) ( 0.460 ) ( 0.432 )
Log of Forex volatility -0.350?? -0.384?? -0.366??
(ln V ol) ( 0.164 ) ( 0.153 ) ( 0.130 )
Days to comply with export -0.024? -0.032?? -0.030??
regulation (ln Reg) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.008 )
Log of geo-trade/GDP ratio 0.398?? 0.336?? 0.305??
(ln F&R) ( 0.145 ) ( 0.106 ) ( 0.094 )
Executive Board seats 0.535? 0.631?? 0.545??
to private sector ( 0.288 ) ( 0.235 ) ( 0.199 )
Degree of decentralization of -0.169 -0.217? -0.262??
agencies devoted to exp. prom. ( 0.122 ) ( 0.119 ) ( 0.093 )
Share of agency budget spent 0.029 0.092 0.081
on non-export promotion activities ( 0.073 ) ( 0.060 ) ( 0.049 )
Strategy focuses on non 0.038 0.062 0.028
traditional exports or sector specic ( 0.095 ) ( 0.072 ) ( 0.066 )
Share of EPA funding coming from 0.087 0.102?? 0.055
public sources ( 0.054 ) ( 0.046 ) ( 0.042 )
Share of country image activities -0.055 -0.069 -0.062
in EPA's expenditure ( 0.088 ) ( 0.076 ) ( 0.070 )
Share of marketing activities -0.020 0.014 0.013
in EPA's expenditure ( 0.070 ) ( 0.068 ) ( 0.054 )
Share of research activities 0.013 0.009 -0.035
in EPA's expenditure ( 0.116 ) ( 0.102 ) ( 0.076 )
Share of export support serv. 0.029 0.008 0.016
in EPA's expenditure ( 0.074 ) ( 0.063 ) ( 0.055 )
Share of large clients 0.001 -0.001 -0.017
in EPA expenditure ( 0.084 ) ( 0.084 ) ( 0.071 )
Share of established exporters -0.010 -0.059 -0.065
in EPA expenditure ( 0.049 ) ( 0.045 ) ( 0.040 )
EPA has representation 0.012 0.233 0.213
oces abroad ( 0.186 ) ( 0.177 ) ( 0.163 )
Constant -3.091 -1.607 -2.224
( 1.841 ) ( 1.711 ) ( 1.414 )
P-value of Chi-squared Wald-test 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of observations 52 52 52
c NA NA 0.706??
( 0.284 )
aThe rst column reports OLS results; the second column 2SlS and the third column reports 2SLS that
also correct for sample selection. Regional dummies included in all regressions.
bWhite robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis; ?? stands for signicance at the 5 percent level;
and ? stands for signicance at the 10 percent level.
cThe selection parameter  (Mills ratio) captures the extent to which selection is a problem in the sample.
When statistically dierent from zero, this suggest that there is a sample bias that needed to be corrected.
26Figure 1: Export Promotion Agency Budgets and Exports per capitaa
aAuthors' calculations using data from the survey and World Bank's World Development Indicators. The
lowess somoother involves the estimation of a locally weighted regression of the log of exports of goods and
services per capita on the log of the export promotion agency budget per capita for small sub-samples of data
(we used STATA 10 default options).
27Appendix Table: Sample Coverage





Austria Austrian Trade, Austrian Federal Economic Chamber OECD
Bangladesh EPB EEA





Burkina Faso ONAC SSA




Costa Rica Procomer LAC
Cote d'Ivoire APEX-CI SSA
Czech Republic Czech Trade EEA
Denmark Trade Council of Denmark OECD
Dominica DEXIA LAC
Dominican Republic CEI-RD LAC
Ecuador CORPEI LAC
Egypt, Arab Rep. ExpoLink MENA
El Salvador Exporta El Salvador LAC










Hong Kong, China HKTDC EEA
Hungary Hungarian Investment and Trade Development Agency EEA
Iceland Trade Council of Iceland OECD
Ireland Enterprise Ireland OECD
Israel Israel Export & International Cooperation Institute MENA
Jamaica JAMPRO LAC
Jordan JEDCO MENA
Kenya Export Promotion Council SSA
Latvia LIDA EEA
Lebanon IDAL MENA




Malta Malta Enterprise MENA








Norway Innovation Norway OECD
Panama National Direction of Investment & Export Promotion LAC
Paraguay PROPARAGUAY LAC
Peru Prompex LAC
Portugal ICEP Portugal OECD
Puerto Rico Compania de Comercio y Exportacion LAC
Rwanda RIEPA SSA
Senegal ASEPEX SSA
Serbia and Montenegro SIEPA EEA
Sierra Leone SLEDIC SSA
Slovak Republic SARIO EEA
Slovenia TIPO EEA
South Africa TISA SSA
Spain ICEX OECD
Sweden Swedish Trade Council OECD
Switzerland OSEC Business Network Switzerland OECD
Taiwan, China TAITRA EEA
Tanzania Board of External Trade SSA
Thailand Department of Export Promotion EEA
Trinidad and Tobago TIDCO Limited LAC
Tunisia FAMEX MENA
Turkey IGEME EEA
Uganda Uganda Export Promotion Board SSA
United Kingdom UKTI OECD
Uruguay Uruguay XXI LAC
Venezuela, RB BANCOEX LAC
Vietnam Vietrade EEA
West Bank and Gaza Paltrade MENA
Yemen, Rep. Yemen Export Supreme Council MENA
Zambia EBZ SSA
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